Abstract: A series of Six-Party Talks involving the United
Despite this, it is striking to note China's willingness to remain an 'honest broker' in the Six-Party framework by admonishing Kim Jong-il to be less obsessed with the purported American 'enmity'. 2 It seems as if the North Korean nuclear issue acts as an informal Sino-American vehicle for dialogue despite the sensitive bilateral relationship. In other words, North Korea provides a 'common forum' for the US and China such that they are content to be engaged in a careful co-ordination of language by reiterating their mutual desire for a 'nuclear-free Korean Peninsula', despite-if not because of-the bilateral frictions elsewhere.
How are we to conceptualise the emergence of such a 'forum' amidst SinoAmerican balance of power? After having repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, and again in late 2002, 3 North
Korea uses its nuclear programme as a bargaining chip to blackmail the US and its allies, not to mention China. Yet, this compels Washington and Beijing to utter similar-sounding pronouncements in such a way that the shared narrative of 'nuclearfree Korean Peninsula' emerges as a common signifier denoting a significant coincidence of wants between the two governments indicating their mutual anxiety that the pursuit of balance of power potentially threatens the stability of Northeast
Asia. Realism as a theoretical tool might help explain some of this; but the balance of power calculations alone cannot account for the emergence of a common language.
This demonstrates that the bilateral balance of power needs to be understood in a nuanced way: while Realpolitik is still relevant, the capacity for Washington and
Beijing to share a common language within this particular context also needs to be taken seriously. As such, the current diplomatic context encourages an additional Constructivist reading on top of the familiar Realist explanation in which we need to explore the language and symbols exchanged in the process. The article aims to explore the co-ordination of language through which the US and China have come to utilise this crisis as a forum for pronouncing shared anxieties.
This article is divided into five sections. The first section provides a very brief overview of the North Korean nuclear crisis that led to the emergence of a coordinated language. The second section provides an account of how language needs to be taken seriously. Given the importance of perceptions in International Relations (IR), diplomatic relations can be recast as a macro-level exchange of symbols. If balance of power is a social construct, 4 then its linguistic framework can be analysed so that the inherent meanings of phrases such as 'nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' can also be discerned. The third section recasts the narratives of 'nuclear-free' as a language borne of iterated interactions throughout the North Korean nuclear crisis.
This shared language provides a forum for both the US and China to reassure one another that at least they can co-ordinate their pronouncements, a precious commodity
given Sino-American tensions elsewhere. The fourth section is a discourse analysis on the various uses of 'nuclear-free' narratives by both Washington and Beijing, paying close attention to the language through which both governments 'talk about' nuclear weapons and regional security in Northeast Asia. Finally, the fifth section discusses the need for recasting 'nuclear-free' narratives as a common language, suggesting that the Sino-American balance of power requires a more nuanced assessment.
A Brief Background
Historically, the Korean Peninsula is considered the powder keg of Northeast Asia and the conventional wisdom considers balance of power as the modus operandi for engagement in the region. 5 Christopher Hughes argues that the crisis emerged after North Korea repeatedly refused International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspectors to monitor its nuclear processing plant at Yongbyon throughout the mid1990s, providing circumstantial evidence that Pyongyang continued with a clandestine nuclear programme. 6 President George Bush (senior) stated in November 1991 that DPRK's alleged nuclear activity constituted a threat to regional security, 7 and 'by late 1992…the IAEA had determined that North Korea had not fully declared its pre-1992 plutonium productions'. 8 Despite its sympathy towards the DPRK, China appreciated that the nuclear allegation was potentially destabilising. As Ming Liu argues, China's response toward the nuclear issue is clear. It represents not only a damage to North Korea's development and survival, but also a major problem for China's relations with the US and its diplomacy in the international community. At most, it is a grave threat to Chinese long-term security interests. China's Foreign Ministry described Pyongyang's action as dangerous adventurism aimed at obtaining US concessions. Some radical views even maintained that this is also an attempt to blackmail China. 9 As such, China's involvement in the North Korean nuclear dispute is symptomatic of the larger framework of balance of power in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang. It was agreed that, in exchange for North Korea freezing its nuclear programme, the regime was to be granted 'nuclear technology and energy supplies estimated to cost US$4 billion in total over a five-year period'. 12 While the Agreement was primarily a bilateral arrangement between the US and DPRK, allies on both sides were enlisted to help. As The Economist puts it, 'America, Japan, and
China all have an interest in avoiding another crisis in the region whether triggered by a sudden increase in the flow of North Korean refugees or by another rocket-propelled raspberry from its unpredictable regime'. 13 China assumed the role of a broker, leading to a four-party meeting in April 1996 involving two Koreas, the US, and
China providing a forum not only for them to try to iron out the differences, but also an opportunity for Beijing and Washington to engage in bilateral negotiations on wider issues. 14 In other words, the nuclear issue represented a double coincidence of wants between the US and China over Northeast Asian security in general, such that the mid-1990s precipitated a period of delicate balance of power between the two states. As for Beijing, it was felt necessary to adopt a cautious approach hoping that neither Washington nor Pyongyang walked away from the fragile negotiations. 
Rivalry and Common Language
The balance of power explanation seems relevant in explaining Sino-American 29 As such, it seems that the two are exchanging tacit signals aimed at forestalling a regional nuclear armsrace.
Thus, on the one hand, we are witnessing the resilience of balancing of power dynamics. Despite Pyongyang's defiance, Beijing remains its steadfast ally, with Hu Jintao telling Kim Jong-il in October 2006 that the bilateral friendship is the 'common treasure of both nations'. 30 The American nuclear umbrella remains relevant as well.
Ruan Zongze suggests that the US has steadily strengthened 'existing relations with its allies in the Asia-Pacific region such as Japan', buttressing its counter-weight against China. 31 On the other hand, it is within this context that both Beijing and Washington seemingly share a willingness to sustain the Six-Party framework, as if there is a double coincidence of wants between the US and China over the benefits of protracted negotiations despite North Korean defiance. Pyongyang's pledge never to return to the Talks seems to have hardened both the American and Chinese resolve to keep on talking for the time being.
While it is perfectly reasonable to expect the parties to maintain conversation while balance of power remains the predominant mode of interaction, the fact remains that the US and China are both reiterating the narrative of 'nuclear-free' to the extent that this shared language seems to mean much more than what it implies on the surface. Put differently, while the 'nuclear free' narratives might be a convenient lipservice for them, it is significant that the parties seem content in being associated with it despite its vagueness. Hence, it can be argued that some kind of co-ordination is emerging from the Six-Party framework, providing Beijing and Washington with a convenient forum upon which an informal line of communication is maintained precisely because the two are engaged in rivalry elsewhere. Within this context, 'nuclear-free' seems to have gained an additional meaning symbolising American and
Chinese non-intention of escalating this particular conflict. Balance of power might still be the modus operandi in Northeast Asia, but the language suggests that the parties are willing to collude with one another, at least in sending out a common message to Pyongyang-and to one another-that a military confrontation needs to be ruled out in the immediate future.
It is also the case that balance of power as a main toolkit for understanding international politics in East Asia needs a nuanced approach. Appreciating SinoAmerican differences in material capabilities are useful, but their use of language also needs exploration. This is why language needs to be taken seriously. Even if both
Beijing and Washington consider denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula to be an impossibility, they nonetheless regurgitate 'nuclear free' in their official pronouncements. This begs the question of why this remains the case if the situation is hopeless. Perhaps 'nuclear free' is devoid of its literal meaning; but the utterance of this phrase by both the US and China seems to suggest that it entails an altogether different signal that both sides are willing to use the Six-Party framework as a precious vehicle of dialogue, precisely because the relationship is fraught with conflicts. It is through their mutual desire to minimise the potentials for escalation that a need for a common language emerges; and their interaction-both hostile and accommodating-provides the backdrop for the emergence of certain set of signifiers that both Beijing and Washington can utilise to forestall a crisis. 32 The Six-Party Talks suggest that, while balance of power remains resilient, it is also the case that coordination is simultaneously taking place. The common language of 'nuclear-free' acts as a signal that the US and China are sending out tacit reassurances that, in this particular context, they are willing to co-ordinate their language over Pyongyang's nuclear programme and Northeast Asian security in general. 33 In response, the US Admiral, Michael Mullen, suggests that China is 'very focused on the US navy and our bases in that part of the world'. 34 Furthermore, President Obama points out the latent zero-sum mentality within Sino-American policy circles, stating that 'some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions; some in America think that there is something to fear in a rising China'. 35 Yet, a further exploration reveals that a common language of 'nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' is emerging as a result of mutual anxieties shared by both Beijing and Washington. It is as if the symbolic nature of nuclear weapons and overall balance of power have mutated from being a tool of security into a vehicle of potential danger.
'Nuclear-Free' Narratives as a Common Signifier of Mutual Anxiety
The threat posed by nuclear weapons is real for the actors involved, but what the nuclear weapons mean to them is also crucial in appreciating their shared anxieties.
Wendt's characterisation provides one perspective. He argues that '[f]ive hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones because of the shared understandings that underpin them'. 36 To be sure, nuclear weapons remain deadly and that is one of the primary reasons why states value them.
Yet, it is also the case that danger can boomerang-back on to nuclear powers themselves in the form of downward spiral of threat perceptions-the security dilemma. 37 Nuclear weapons lose their efficacy as symbols of national security, and instead, re-emerge as potential drivers of insecurity, prompting a reconstruction of a different linguistic structure through which nuclear weapons are portrayed. Needless to say, both China and the US rely on them; but once proliferation of nuclear weapons reaches a certain point, the sense of enhanced security diminishes, superseded by the uncertainties of potential arms race as other players also seek to enhance their sense of security. 38 As such, Sino-American anxieties over each other's intentions in East Asia that fuelled nuclear proliferation in the first place evolved into their mutual concern about what might happen if North Korea is left unchecked. Hence, an interesting element of the nuclear crisis is that both China and the US seem intent on signalling that a security dilemma is emerging; and that they are ready to share a common language to minimise the inherent risks.
Thus, the narrative of denuclearisation denotes the existence of mutual fears about nuclear proliferation in the vicinity of Korean Peninsula; and the Six-Party framework presents itself as a convenient linguistic space within which the two can engage in an informal dialogue. The nuclear crisis as a significant factor within this rivalry is now returning to haunt the two regional powers with a probability of unfettered arms race in Northeast Asia. Effectively, this is an Agent-Structure issue in practice. 39 Agents reproduce structures; but there is nothing to prevent the structure from imparting contradictions between the agents' understandings of the status quo, thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat', 40 to the extent that '[a]nything can be a risk'. 41 The centrepiece of debate within Six-Party
Talks entails the US arguing that North Korean nuclear programme threatens the stability of Northeast Asia, something to which Beijing tacitly agrees, on the one hand; while the DPRK emphasises that it is designed as a defensive posture, vis-à-vis, the US, on the other. Yet, it must be recognised that both arguments pay lip service to the recognition that denuclearisation is a necessity. 42 This is why the language of 'nuclear-free' needs to be taken seriously. Iain Johnston in deriding Constructivism's 'mythic "story about path dependence and mutual constitution" between the purported identity construction in East Asia on the one hand, and the reality of East Asian regionalism on the other'. 45 Yet, it is striking to note that the narrative of 'nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' exists despite such the sense that they are treated as facts that, because they are given by the nature of the interstate system, can be taken for granted'. 46 The North Korean nuclear crisis is an end product of this taken-for-grantedness: nuclear weapons were taken for granted as enhancing security. The problem emerges once such assumption boomerangs back to re-emerge as the very source of regional insecurity already made volatile as a result of other conflicts. This reified danger and the perceived need to ameliorate it partly explains China's penchant for performing the role of an honest broker. 47 Also, it is plausible to suggest that the realisation of the status quo as risky and unsustainable compelled the US to claim in July 2005 that, it has 'no intention to attack or invade
[DPRK]', enticing North Korea to agree to the longer-term goal of 'denuclearisation of Korean peninsula'. 48 In the previous rounds, similar acknowledgements to the limits of balance of power were made. China recognised the potentials for an arms race in Northeast Asia in April 2000; 49 
and North Korea announced in February 2004
that all it wanted was a 'security assurance'-something they still desire. 50 As Roy argues, Beijing understands that DPRK's adventures can potentially hurt itself, rather than strengthen its national interest in the longer run. 51 Pre-9/11, Norman Levin notes that Beijing played a 'generally constructive role in supporting efforts to draw North Korea into the world community.' 52 The irony is that, following 9/11, Pyongyang's stance effectively brought together rivals, inadvertently encouraging co-ordination between the US and China in this particular crisis. Hence, while a Realist theorising would have predicted an arms race in Northeast Asia, the result is that major actors are applying brakes on this purportedly dangerous momentum.
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'Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula' as a Shared Language
The language of 'nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' as a familiar signifier within Sino-
American foreign policy pronouncements is most apparent in the October 1994
Agreed Framework on the Nuclear Issue between the US and the DPRK. While the bulk of the document focuses on the technicalities of providing North Korea with light-water reactors (LWRs), there are numerous references to the idea of creating a 'nuclear-free' peninsula. The second paragraph of the Preamble refers to 'the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the US and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula', and that the parties have 'decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue'. After discussing the technical details of LWR provision, Paragraph III stipulates that:
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
1. The US will provide formal assurance to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US. 2. The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 3. The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such a dialogue.
The Agreed Framework implies a tacit compact between the US and DPRK that a nuclear standoff somehow needs to be ameliorated. China, too, seems to appreciate that the vague language of 'nuclear-free' can be leveraged to send a signal that multiparty framework needs to be preserved. On the one hand, Beijing's stance is that developing states have the right to pursue a safe nuclear programme; 54 but on the other hand, the Chinese foreign ministry had to point out in January 2003-after Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT-that 'we hope to continue to safeguard the universality of the NPT and will continue to work for the peaceful solution of the nuclear question of the DPRK'. 55 Hence, the North Korean nuclear issue seems to have prescribed China's preference into pursuing the role of an honest broker as its national interest.
Even if 'nuclear-free' is a lip-service, it nevertheless constitutes a central and that 'it is in the common interests of China and the US to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula'. 57 At the close of the fifth round of talks in February 2007, the participants reiterated their commitment towards 'a major and solid stride…towards the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula'. 58 Within the larger framework of regional security in Northeast Asia, Hu noted in May 2002 that, 'for various reasons, China and the US do not see eye to eye on some issues. Yet we can, through dialogue on an equal footing, increase our understanding, expand areas of agreement and generally reduce our differences'. 59 Victor Cha argues that China's goal is 'non-confrontational solution and a "cherishing" of the Agreed Framework'. 60 The narratives of denuclearisation have become a convenient tool for the antagonists to reassure one another of their intentions-or non-intention-in light of their mutual misgivings. This denotes a set of emerging parameters within which the North Korean nuclear issue is to be framed; and in turn both the US and China are beginning to leverage the North Korean crisis into a valuable forum for informal dialogue.
Soeya Yoshihide suggests that China understands the magnitude of nuclear allegations against Pyongyang, and realises its ramifications not only for the stability of the Korean Peninsula, but also for the region as a whole. 61 Despite its fragile nature, the symbolism itself that the talks are alive is enough to satisfy Chinese self-confidence in sustaining the momentum.
Dovetailing of The Sino-American Language
China's resolve during the round of negotiations in July 2005 cannot simply be brushed aside as mere posturing, for that fails to address why China jealously guards its stance as an honest broker, given that a failure can diminish Beijing's status and confidence. Acknowledging US concerns over alleged uranium enrichment programme during February 2004 is a strong indication that China is keen to keep the narratives of 'nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' alive. 68 As Alastair Iain Johnston puts it, 'China's leaders prefer the geopolitical status quo', 69 and hence shares an interest with the US and Japan in 'supporting the institutions designed to (restrain) North Korea' from tipping the nuclear balance. 70 Adam Ward also argues that, 'Washington and Beijing both view Pyongyang as a menace to regional security, and they share a commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula'. 71 Hence, it seems that China is content to exploit the nuclear crisis as a convenient forum to maintain a particular linguistic framework along with the US.
Back in 1997, Joseph Nye noted that 'the US has rejected the argument that conflict with China is inevitable', given the multitude of problems that can only be ameliorated through co-ordination rather than conflict. 72 A closer inspection of Chinese actions casts doubts over whether Realpolitik thinking alone can explain the complexities of collusion amidst conflicts. Kyung-won Kim argues that, At the moment, the assumption that 'order' does not mean a hegemonic hierarchy seems to have freed the region's major powers from the kind of compulsion or supremacy that characterised Asian international relations in the past. 'willing to continue to play a constructive role for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula'. 76 Furthermore, Qin Gam, the spokesperson for the Chinese delegation to the fifth round, noted in July 2005 that 'since the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is complicated, it is normal for parties concerned to have different stances…. The heads of six delegations also agreed to "fish together"'. 77 In highlighting the linkage between the nuclear crisis and the need for wider Sino-American dialogue, Premier
Wen Jiabao argued in September 2008 that the US and China may not see eye to eye on certain issues. This is nothing terrible. As long as we engage in dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual respect, we will be able to gradually dispel misgivings and enhance mutual trust.
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The Obama administration follows a similar line of argument, with Hillary Clinton stating in an interview to a Japanese journalist in February 2009 that 'the six-party talks are a good forum', adding that 'Japan, China, and the United States have a lot of concerns in common', leaving open the possibility of a 'trilateral dialogue'. 79 In another interview to CNN, she argues that 'North Korea can be either of those ["tyrannical unpredictable country" or "a country that has the ability to act
rationally"]'. 80 The New York Times quotes her as saying that 'the most immediate issue is to continue the disarmament of their nuclear facilities and to get a complete and verifiable agreement as to the end of their nuclear program', but adding that 'North Korea is on China's border, and I want to understand better what the Chinese believe is doable'.
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As such, the North Korean nuclear issue is emblematic of contemporary balance of power in Northeast Asia: that both Beijing and Washington remain weary of one another on the wider issues of security in Northeast Asia; but where their mutual anxieties and interests coincide, balance of power necessitates a particular linguistic device to maintain it. In other words, balance of power is not just about the tangible effects of differences in material capabilities, but it also involves the employment of intangibles such as language and symbols. Hence, the Sino-American balance of power is one form of a social relationship based around a particular linguistic framework.
The concerted efforts at bringing North Korea back into the multi-party framework exemplify the emergence of a common forum for Sino-American conversation. In essence, both Beijing and Washington are comfortable in using a shared language to entice Pyongyang back into negotiations. 82 On the one hand, Pyongyang's efforts at driving a wedge through the alliance after the July 2005 meeting had exposed an inherent fragility in the Six-Party framework; but on the other hand, it also revealed that the actors are still intent on reiterating the language of denuclearisation amidst North Korean defiance. 83 The perseverance of this new signifier in light of difficulties and challenges is a good indication of its resilience.
Nuclear Crisis as a Precious Linguistic Space
The emergence of 'nuclear-free' as a common language and the Six-Party framework For the foreseeable future, the China-US relationship will generally remain stable-yet also uncertain in some areas. China consistently adheres to seeking cooperation on the issues of common concern while maintaining different views from the world's sole superpower in some areas of dispute. and the Sino-American conviction that balance of power as a primary mode of interaction still prevails. This makes it all the more significant that the language of nuclear crisis is converging.
The common concerns shared by Beijing and Washington seem to have dovetailed nicely into a convergence of mutual anxieties; and that the North Korean nuclear issue emerged as a convenient forum within which both governments are able to reiterate similar-sounding aspirations, while the familiar balance of power dynamics are played out elsewhere. Pyongyang's continued defiance remains their primary concern; yet, the US and Chinese efforts at reassuring one another over their non-intention to escalate the crisis lend themselves to the argument that the North
Korean nuclear issue as a product of Sino-American balance of power nevertheless requires a nuanced reading of how shared linguistic space emerges amid rivalry.
'Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' as a condition remains a distant dream, but as a set of narratives, it provides a significant scope for permitting two rivals to co-ordinate their pronouncements with a scope for certain spill-overs into other aspects of their relationship in the Asia-Pacific region.
Conclusion
The two main regional players in Northeast Asia-the US and China-both seem intent on preserving the momentum that emerged following a series of negotiations Korea in which Pyongyang signalled that it might be ready to consider dismantling its nuclear programme turns out to be premature: 95 while it was a positive step forward back then, the process has now stalled. 96 Yet, the November 2005 meeting that adjourned no sooner than it had convened bought time for China to 'save face' and maintain some semblance of integrity. It shows that China is still steadfast on its selfproclaimed role as an honest broker determined to preserve the discussions by urging the hermit kingdom to subscribe to the current multilateral framework in future rounds, 97 This is not to deny that the balance of power considerations need to be discarded. Indeed, China's naval strategy suggests that it is an increasingly useful conceptual tool for explaining the current developments in Northeast Asia. 99 Balance of power explanations are still relevant, but when we turn our attention to the language of 'nuclear free Korean Peninsula', we also witness the seeming collusion of mutual anxieties between Washington and Beijing. Hence, we can observe both the US and China reiterating the phrase as a convenient signifier to signal that the status quo is potentially detrimental. This seems to indicate the dovetailing of mutual anxieties in and around the Korean Peninsula providing Beijing and Washington with a forum for them to engage in reassuring one another of their non-intentions in escalating the crisis; and to exploit the existing line of communication to avert unnecessary conflict.
The proponents of security community must await the current arrangement to evolve into a more formalised institution capable of identifying common threats and reacting in a co-ordinated fashion, let alone, define exactly what is meant by 'nuclearfree' Korean Peninsula. This might not materialise in the end. The current arrangement falls well short of collective identity formation allowing participants to engage with one another with full confidence. 100 The North Korean missile tests in 'brazen act' that ignores the longstanding opposition by international communityan 'unusually harsh words from North Korea's biggest provider of aid and its only friend'. 102 But the way in which the international community keeps on addressing this concern suggests that a focus on the collusion of Sino-American language is still a relevant mode of analysis over what the parties are trying to achieve. 103 While pessimism lingers following repeated assertion by Pyongyang that it will never return to the Six-Party Talks, once the gaze is turned on to the emerging linguistic framework between the US and China, unfettered pessimism seems less justifiable.
Sino-American balance of power lingers; but informal lines of communication also remain open for the time being; and when it comes to North Korea, they seem comfortable enough in sharing this language, however unrealisable the objective might be. An introspection into the way participants at the multilateral talks behaved suggests an emergence of a forum in which the parties agree on the importance of coordinated approach to North Korea by shunting aside old rivalries, however temporary that might be.
The implications are significant. The seemingly Realpolitik outlook of international relations in Northeast Asia nevertheless instantiates an emergence of a common, normative, framework. Put differently, balance of power needs to be recast as a form of macro-level social relations in which common language needs to be taken seriously if we are to adequately appreciate its ramifications. It is all too tempting to treat the US and China as rivals: their interests diverge on many fronts, but they are also keen not to push their differences too far. 104 No doubt this is astute bargaining.
Yet, it is equally necessary to explore their shared use of a similar set of signifiers within a particular framework. As such, this mode of analysis lends itself to taking ambiguities seriously, enabling us to observe the subtleties of informal institutional structures in East Asia. There is no indication of how long China will stick to its role as an honest broker; but its current adherence to it is noteworthy. Such is the significance of the manner in which governments around the Asia-Pacific region, including the US, are behaving today that warrants an infusion of Constructivist nuance into the prevailing Realpolitik considerations.
